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Abstract:         The purpose of this paper is to consider the problem of allocating
the costs of a public facility with large fixed costs and increasing returns to
scale. A particular case is considered for the natural gas transportation
industry. A model for allocating capacity over time is considered. The ap-
proach is to find optimal pricing so that social welfare is maximized while
the common facility is efficiently used. If individuals have property rights
to the capacity of the common facility, the result of the analysis leads to the
existence of market-clearing prices through a secondary market for
the capacity of the common facility.
Resumen:         El objetivo de este documento es considerar el problema de
asignación de costos de un bien público con costos fijos y rendimientos
crecientes a escala. En particular, se considera el caso del transporte del
gas natural. Se desarrolla un modelo para la asignación de la capacidad a
través del tiempo. El objetivo del modelo es encontrar los precios óptimos
que maximizan el bienestar social a la vez que se utiliza eficientemente
la infraestructura. El análisis muestra que si los agentes económicos tie-
nen derechos de propiedad de la capacidad de la infraestructura común,
entonces se tendrán precios de equilibrio en el mercado a través de un
mercado secundario para la capacidad del bien público.
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W
hen comparing alternatives in providing natural gas transpor-
tation service, it is important to consider the overall costs of
transportation, including capital and maintenance and operating costs.
The choice between the different production factors, if an optimal level
of efficiency is to be attained, must be selected considering their rela-
tive prices and marginal productivity. The cost structure of the natu-
ral gas transportation industry can be characterized as one with large
fixed costs. Once a pipeline has been constructed, the capital costs are
“sunk” costs, fixed and independent of the usage level of the pipeline.
The cost of installing a public facility and the investment required
to maintain it are very large and highly independent of its utilization,
rendering the costs associated with pipelines to increase less than
proportionally to usage. Furthermore, since a single pipeline can serve
a large range of users before its capacity is fully used, investment in
pipe is both short- and long-run indivisible, and therefore huge fixed
costs will be spread over a large number of output units as the pipe
usage is increased.1
In addition to the previous facts, due to the increasing returns to
scale in the industry’s production technology, it follows that long-run
marginal cost is less than the long-run average cost per unit.2 There-
fore, using marginal-cost pricing would lead to a deficit for the firm.
In such a case, the firm would not break even and would require a
subsidy to cover the deficit in order to continue production, necessi-
tating a redistribution of income from non-users to users of the ser-
vice. As can be seen in Figure 1, if the demand curve intersects LRMC
while it is declining, charging customers only long-run marginal cost
will produce a loss to the firm, as denoted by the triangle abc. Hence
using marginal cost pricing will not allow a pipeline company to break-
even. In fact, under the constraint of full allocation of cost, the opti-
mal natural gas transportation rates will exceed marginal cost.
If the deficit introduced by marginal cost pricing is covered by
subsidization, it will cause inefficiencies due to price distortions and
resource misallocation. Therefore, the efficiency of marginal-cost pric-
ing will be questionable whenever a non-user is forced to pay for a
public facility. In consideration of this problem, Coase (1946) made
the observation that users must pay the full cost of receiving a service
1 Indivisibilities lead to decreasing costs, since once the pipeline has been constructed, any
amount of gas to the limit can be transported through the pipe.
2 Ariel Yépez (1994), A Cost Function for the Natural Gas Transmission Industry. Applied
Price Theory Workshop, University of Chicago, April.109
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to achieve efficiency. Coase stated that not only should the cost of
producing the marginal unit be covered by its price, but also that the
cost of all units should be covered by payments from users. Following
his argument, we see that if the price a user pays does not cover the
total cost of his demands, then there are some factors used in supply-
ing him which are not being accounted for in the price. The use of
these factors is therefore not being economized and efficiency is not ob-
tained. In other words, if someone does not wish to pay the total cost of
supplying his own demands, the value in his use of the factors used
to supply him is less than what their value would be in some other use.
Welfare and fairness problems open the question of how to charge
each customer his fair share of the cost and still ensure that the firm
will break even. One way to deal with these problems is by looking for
methods where all cost of the public facility are met by payments
from its users, providing fair and non-discriminatory charges under
some criteria.
Cost  Cost  Cost  Cost  Cost Allocation Allocation Allocation Allocation Allocation
Three related questions may be settled before an agreement to build a
public facility. These questions have to do with the number of users of
the facility, the optimal size of the facility, and the charge scheme for
covering the total costs of the system. Once the project has been desig-
ned optimally to satisfy the necessities of the users, one problem that
Figure 1. Figure 1. Figure 1. Figure 1. Figure 1. Decreasing marginal cost110
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arises is how to commit agents interested in receiving the service of
the public facility to cover the cost of the facility over its lifetime.
Long-Term Contracts
In most of the cases public facilities are large investments in special-
ized, immobile and market-specific capital. These particular charac-
teristics, as well as the vulnerability to be affected by fluctuations in
economic activity, may affect the long-term relationship between pub-
lic facility users and the facility owner.
The eventuality of a fall in the capacity demanded from a facility
may threaten the ability of the facility company to recover the cost of
its investment. On the other hand, the possibility of a shortage will
affect the interests of customers who wish to have a secure capacity of
the public facility in sufficient quantities to meet their current and
expected necessities. Situations such as these, which generate uncer-
tainty among the agents in the facility industry, will lead these agents
to seek out opportunities to arrange long-term agreements that effi-
ciently allocate the risks they would be facing over time.
Hence, the size and financial risks involved in the construction of
a public facility, together with the risks of inefficient bargaining and
opportunistic behavior, dictate the necessity of long-term contracts to
protect long-term investments in the facility. Otherwise, the convenien-
ce of developing a project may be threatened by the uncertain ability
of the firm to cover the cost of the system over its useful lifetime.
The economic literature on this efficiency approach asserts that long-
term contracts may help to distribute risks in a socially efficient man-
ner in situations with specific and immobile capital. As Telser argues:
Long-term contracts between suppliers and their customers such as the
take-or-pay contracts in natural gas are arrangements that restrict com-
petition [...] these restrictions advance the public interest by preventing
exploitation of those who have incurred large fixed investments that raise
efficiency and thereby accommodate their customers (1996, p. 86).
The case of the natural gas transportation industry is one of those
where this kind of agreements are necessary. Long-term contracts
benefit the pipeline companies by reducing the financial risk of non
covering their fixed costs and by decreasing the possibility of a short-
age for consumers. Furthermore, they eliminate the expense and un-111
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certainty of frequent rate reviews. Thus both the pipeline company
and the consumers will be willing to enroll in long-term agreements
that allocate the risks inherent to any economic transaction in the
natural gas industry. However, long-term contracts can involve sub-
stantial costs. Since contracts reduce the flexibility to react to market
supply and demand conditions, the greater uncertainty associated with
distant horizons can make inflexible pricing particularly hazardous,
affecting the willingness of each signer to perform as promised in the
long-term contract.
Allocation of Capacity over Time
Due to changes in the performance of the agents concerned with the
facility, a problem that may arise is the possible presence of incom-
patibilities in the demand and supply for the facility capacity over
time. As time elapses, after the facility is functioning, some owners of
the capacity rights of the facility may be sub-utilizing their reserved
capacity, while other users may require additional capacity. For instan-
ce, in the case of the natural gas transportation industry, the dynamics
of the natural gas industry will require the existence of a market that
helps shift capacity where it is most needed, ensuring that no higher-
valued users are deprived of gas and that capacity owners receive
true market value for their rights. The creation of such a market will be-
nefit capacity users if they can sell their unneeded capacity and thereby
reduce their obligation to pay the higher reservation cost associated
with the long-term contract.
A market for capacity would permit users to negotiate an assign-
ment of capacity that reflects the services that users need from the
public facility. In such a framework, current owners of the capacity of
the facility would be able to sell their capacity rights in an organized
capacity market to users who had already been utilizing the services
of the facility, or, alternatively, to outsiders who could buy the capac-
ity rights for their own use.
The following model considers the market approach to capacity
allocation over time. It attempts to simulate the behavior of agents
who use the common facility during different periods of time, given
that the capacity of the facility is constrained. The approach is to find
optimal pricing so that social welfare is maximized while the common
facility is efficiently used.112
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The Model
Consider the case in which a group of consumers N = {1,.., n} wishes to
share the service of a pipeline with a limited capacity Q. Let qj
i be the
capacity used by individual i (i = 1,.., n) at time j (j = 1,.., t). Also let
qi = (q1
i ,..., qt
i) be the vector (of dimension t) of capacities used by the
agent i over all the periods of time. Suppose also that each agent has
a valuation function Vi(qi) that represents the maximum that indi-
vidual i would be willing to pay for consumption  qV
ii t (( ) : ) . •ℜ→ ℜ
Furthermore, assume that Vi(qi) is a non-decreasing concave function
with continuous first-order partial derivatives. Agents are further
required to have initial ownership of the capacity of the pipeline. Let
yi = (y1
i,.., yt
i) designate the vector (of dimension t) of initial endow-
ments of capacity of individual i over all periods of time.
The objective is to maximize the sum of consumers’ valuations of




















Constraint (1) means that, for each period of time, the capacity
allocated to agents is lower than or equal to the total initial endow-
ment of capacity in each time period. Constraint (2) represents the
fact that total initial endowments cannot be larger than the capacity
of the system in each time period.
The social welfare maximization problem can be expressed as:
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It must be noted that the constraint denotes an inequality between
the vector of demand of capacities and the vector of total endowments;
hence each element in the vector represents the capacity constraint
in each period of time. The Lagrangian for this problem is:3
3 Since  yq
ii t ,, ∈ℜ the vector of Lagrange multipliers, λ, has dimension tq y
t () λ∈ℜ ⋅ ⋅
 = Σqiyi denotes the inner product of the vectors q and y.113
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where =Vi is the vector (of dimension t) of partial derivatives of Vi(•),
and λ denotes the vector of Lagrange multipliers in the optimum.
Furthermore, from the former optimization problem, we can de-
rive the following minimization problem:














In the minimization problem, it must be noticed that there are n
vectors of constraints, one vector for each individual.
The Lagrangian for the minimization problem is defined as fol-
lows:
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where qi denotes the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with
agent i for this minimization problem.
We can verify the relationship that arises between the former op-
timization problems. The Lagrangian for the minimization problem
can be expressed as follows:114
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Considering the Lagrangian of the maximization problem in equa-
tion (4), we can simplify the expression of the Lagrangian for the mini-
mization problem:
( ) [] Dq V V q
ii i i
i
=ℑ+ ⋅∇ − ∑ (7)
Two points should be noticed in this equation, regarding the rela-
tionship among the optimal solutions to problems (3) and (5). Due to
the concavity of the valuation function, we have:
qVV q
ii i i ⋅∇ ≤ ()
Hence the following condition for the Lagrangian functions of the
two optimization problems will be binding;
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Furthermore, due to the complementary slackness condition in
(4b) and (6b), the second term in both sides of the inequality cancel
out, leading to the following relationship between the solutions of prob-
lems (3) and (5):










The inequality says that the value of the capacity of the common
facility does not exceed the maximal total valuation of its services.
The existence of that gap allows an opportunity for an arrangement
among the users of the pipeline through a market for capacity. The
existence of the vector of shadow prices λ, derived in the maximization
problem, provides a powerful instrument for reaching an arrangement
that optimizes the use of capacity of the public facility among the
consumers. Thus agents will be able to improve their situations by115
The Secondary Market for Capacity in Natural Gas Transportation
trading their rights of property to the pipeline, selling excess or buy-
ing additional capacity in such a way that the capacity of the common
facility will be allocated optimally.
The rate system defined by the optimization problem equilibrates
the market for capacity, creating the signals that allow the different
economic agents to take adequate economic decisions. Furthermore,
it provides the industry with a device for finding the opportunity cost
of capacity at any specific time.
Thus, the acquisition of capacity rights is susceptible to competi-
tion, and a free market for capacity allows the agents concerned to
trade their rights and find the optimal use of the pipeline. The equi-
librium between demand and supply sets the charge for capacity equal
to its shadow price at each period in such a way that, if each agent
pays the shadow price of capacity of the common facility, social welfare
will be maximized and the market will efficiently allocate the capacity
of the common facility users.
Peak load pricing
An important factor derived from the previous analysis is the exist-
ence of prices for different time slots depending on agents’ valuations.
In particular, we notice that the shadow price of capacity gives us a
peak-load pricing scheme.
Suppose there is one time slot j with excess capacity. Then the











Therefore, due to the complementary slackness condition in (4b),
the shadow price associated with that time slot will be zero. Thus,
whenever there is excess capacity during a time slot, the price for
capacity in that period of time will be zero, while whenever capacity is
fully used, there is a positive price for that capacity.
The result above is an important element to be considered in de-
signing pricing policies for industries with capacity restrictions over
time. Due to the variability of demand for a public facility, most of
times will be easy to identify two consumption periods, one in which
capacity is binding (peak periods) and one with excess capacity (off-
peak periods). Hence the associated shadow price of capacity in the peak116
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period will be positive, while the shadow price associated with periods
with excess capacity will be zero, making the peak users bear the whole
cost of capacity since they are responsible for it. Thus the charges to
peak-period users will allocate the costs of capacity improvements
efficiently, and will send strong signals about the demand for extra
capacity.4
Cost and Benefits of a Market for Capacity in Natural Gas
Transportation Industries
Creating a market for capacity can be expected to provide benefits.
However, those benefits are likely to have different impacts among
the various segments of users and to have associated and sometimes
offsetting costs.
Certainly, some problems have to be faced in order to make com-
petitive markets work in the natural gas transportation industry. The
centerpiece of the capacity market is the ability to introduce trans-
portation competition. Thus, the question is how effectively a viable
free market can be sustained over the long term, when such competi-
tion must take place, even though pipeline systems may be operated
as local monopolies.
To create competition, the government and the regulatory authori-
ties must create the proper conditions. Attempts to introduce compe-
tition in a structure as the one of the natural gas transportation in-
dustry should promote the creation of property rights for the capacity.
Once property rights are introduced in the industry, a condition
for the proper functioning of a market for capacity is access to nondis-
criminatory information. Complete and timely information about avail-
able transportation capacity and transactions will provide a powerful
instrument for those who buy and sell that capacity, and will allocate
its use to those who most value it. Alternatively, it must be allowed
the existence of brokers to promote the trade of capacity of the trans-
portation system.5 Those brokers will match up buyers with sellers of
4 Off-peak users are not responsible for the creation of additional capacity, hence they
should not bear its cost. However, this does not exclude them from paying the variable cost of
moving the natural gas throughout the pipeline.
5 Operation of secondary markets may be promoted by the industry brokers. The informa-
tion created by these brokers will provide flexibility to the long-term contracts; furthermore,
such flexibility will reduce moral hazard problems as long as reputation is acquired through the
transactions among the agents.117
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capacity, taking a buyer-reseller role. Under these circumstances, us-
ing a broker’s service could be less costly for a consumer than expending
resources on staff and equipment in order to arrange its own gas pur-
chases.
The capacity market will help to ensure that pipeline capacity is
held by those who value it most. If prices for capacity are allowed to
move freely, the owners of property rights will be able to sell unneeded
capacity at a price determined by the market, allowing them to nego-
tiate an assignment of capacity that reflects the services that they
need from the pipeline company. Such an arrangement would prove
particularly beneficial to large industrial users and electric utilities.
Since these users will be able to modify their capacity responsibilities
according to their necessities, the arrangement will have an appre-
ciable effect on costs. In addition, any reduction of costs to industrial
users and power generation companies could be of indirect value to
their consumers, since it might in turn reduce the price of the prod-
ucts or services it provides.
Flexible prices for capacity may also increase efficiency by pro-
moting use of the pipeline more evenly throughout the year. The greater
potential for price flexibility offered by a capacity market will increase
the flexibility with which economic agents are able to adjust to mar-
ket conditions, thereby allowing an efficient use of the pipeline capac-
ity and promoting high load factors in the system.
Market prices will allow transportation companies to take advan-
tage of economies of scale by designing pipelines that minimize op-
eration and capital costs.  This will generate investments at an ad-
equate level to face market demands. If transportation rates were
low, additional pipeline capacity would have to be constructed until
the market rate fell in order to eliminate any economic rent. On the
other hand, if rates were overpriced, the resulting excess capacity
would keep potential investors out of the market.
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
Throughout this paper, particular emphasis is placed on the role of
long-term contracts to efficiently allocate the risks of an investment
of the nature of a pipeline. Due to the inherent risk of every economic
transaction in the natural gas transportation industry, long-term con-
tracts may guarantee the financial viability of an investment of the118
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nature of a pipeline with immobile and specialized capital. Another
factor of relevance to the pricing policies of this industry is the cre-
ation of a market that would be required to have a dynamic and effi-
cient allocation of capacity over time.
The model proposed attempts to simulate the behavior of agents
who use a common facility during different periods of time, given that
the capacity of the facility is constrained. The approach of the model
is to find optimal pricing so that the common facility is used efficiently.
It has been shown that if individuals have property rights to the ca-
pacity of the common facility, the result of the analysis leads to the
existence of market-clearing prices for the capacity of the pipeline at
different periods of time. Moreover, a peak-load pricing scheme was
obtained, in which, whenever there is excess capacity during a time slot,
the price for the capacity in that period of time will be zero, whereas
whenever the capacity is fully used, there is a positive price for that
capacity.
Finally, it must be noted that the results proposed for the natural
gas industry in the paper may be adapted to many other industries
that have scale economies and specific capital. First, the common cost
allocation described in this paper may be suitable to apply in indus-
tries such as railroads, electric power generation and transmission,
telecommunication industries, and oil pipelines, among others. By
applying the results obtained in the analysis above, these industries
would be able to break-even and to produce according to cost-mini-
mizing principles. Second, the market-for-capacity framework may
be applied to facilities with a capacity constraint, such as the oil and
electricity transmission industries. Here, benefits of that approach
are similar to those described for the natural gas industry: efficient
allocation of capacity over time and the existence of an accurate mecha-
nism for revealing the signals that guide the investing and consump-
tion decisions of the agents in these industries.
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